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Abstract. Flexibility of management is an important requisite for ac-
cess control systems as it allows users to adapt the access control system
in accordance with practical requirements. This paper builds on ear-
lier work where we defined administrative policies for a general class of
RBAC models. We present a formal definition of administrative refine-
ment and we show that there is an ordering for administrative privileges
which yields administrative refinements of policies. We argue (by giving
an example) that this privilege ordering can be very useful in practice,
and we prove that the privilege ordering is tractable.
1 Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) [1] is a well-known standard for access
control, aimed to make the assignment of users to privileges more easy. In
practice however, for example in hospitals or enterprises, RBAC policies
can be very large and dynamic, consisting of thousands of roles [6], and
changing frequently. In such cases policy management can be a daunting
task. The usual approach to this problem is to divide the work and to
delegate (bits of) administrative authority to other users. The advantage
is that users can adapt the access control policy to changing circumstances
more easily, without an administrative bottleneck. Not only does this
reduce the cost of maintaining the access control policy, it also avoids
bad security practices, such as sharing passwords or keys that should
really remain secret. For example, it may be convenient to allow the head
nurse to delegate database access to other nurses when they need it for
particular tasks, without having to recur to the hospital’s security officer.
On the other hand, this kind of flexibility also introduces security risks
as changes made to the RBAC policy could entail privacy breaches.
The issue of designing flexible yet safe policy administration mecha-
nisms for RBAC has received much attention recently [3, 4, 6, 9, 14]. To
mention some of the research: In ARBAC [9] administrative privileges are
assigned to a separate hierarchy of administrative roles and defined by
specifying a range of roles that can be changed. Crampton and Loizou [4]
take a more general approach, by using the same hierarchy for both ad-
ministrative privileges and ordinary user privileges. Using the concept of
administrative scope, they define which roles should have administrative
privileges over other roles. In a similar approach, Wang and Osborn [12]
divide the role-graph (a type of RBAC policy) into administrative do-
mains. Each administrative domain has one administrator with privileges
about the (roles in the) domain. In the Role-Control Center [6], admin-
istrative privileges over roles are defined in terms of views, which are
subsets of the role-hierarchy, and they can only be assigned to users that
are assigned to these roles. There seems to be no consensus (yet) about
which administrative privileges belong to which roles; each of the above
mentioned frameworks differs on this issue. Some models motivate their
choice by considerations that include the meaning of a role in a company,
or the concepts of ownership, and responsibility, as one would find it in a
company. On the other hand, Li et al. argue that interpreting the RBAC
role hierarchy as a business organization chart can be misleading [8].
This paper aims to be a contribution to the above-mentioned lines of
research on management of RBAC policies. In this paper we introduce
the concept of administrative refinement, and we show that this concept
yields a more flexible, and at the same time more safe administrative
model. This paper builds on earlier work [5], where we argued informally
that there is a natural ordering for administrative privileges. In this paper
we present a formal definition of administrative refinement, and we show
that it yields an ordering on the administrative privileges, which allows for
a more flexible policy management. Furthermore, we present the formal
proof that this privilege ordering is tractable. Note that in this paper
we do not assume any features that go beyond the General Hierarchical
RBAC model (such as constraints), and that we do not restrict which
administrative privileges can be assigned to which roles. We are hence
led to believe that our results are also applicable to a range of more
advanced RBAC models.
2 Preliminaries
We first introduce shortly the General Hierarchical RBAC model, as de-
fined in the ANSI RBAC standard, because it is the most commonly used
RBAC model [1, 6]. In Section 3 we extend this model with administrative
privileges, yielding a general class of administrative policies.
The goal of an RBAC policy is to specify which users are permitted
to perform which actions on which objects. We denote the sets of users,
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roles, actions, and objects, by U , R, A, and O. Permissions for performing
actions on objects are called user privileges, forming a set P ⊆ A×O,











Fig. 1. Sample Non-Administrative RBAC policy.
A non-administrative RBAC policy assigns users to roles, roles to user
privileges, and it defines an order on the roles; the role-hierarchy3.
Definition 1 (Non-administrative Policies). Let U , R, and P be sets
of users, roles, and user privileges, a non-administrative RBAC policy φ
is a tuple
φ = (UA,RH ,PA),
where UA ⊆ U ×R determines which users are member of which roles,
RH ⊆ R×R is the role-hierarchy, and PA ⊆ R× P determines which
roles have which privileges.
The set of non-administrative RBAC policies is denoted ΦU,R,P . To sim-
plify our exposition we treat a policy φ as a directed graph, defined by the
set of directed edges UA ∪ RH ∪ PA. If there is a path from one vertex v
to another v′ we write v →φ v′. Below we sometimes omit the subscript
φ when the policy is clear from the context.
The RBAC reference monitor uses the policy φ as follows. Any user
u can start a session. The reference monitor allows the user to activate
3 In the RBAC standard the relation RH is defined to be acyclic, reflexive and tran-
sitive, i.e. it is defined to be a partial order. Li et al., however, showed that this
definition causes problems when changes are made to the role-hierarchy [8]. Here,
for the sake of generality we do not assume that RH is a partial order.
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a role r in a session iff u →φ r. The privileges of the user’s session are
all the privileges p such that r →φ p for some role r activated in the
session. Sessions are an important safety mechanism, allowing users to
apply the principle of least privilege. Here, for the sake of simplicity we
ignore the details about sessions. For details about sessions we refer the
reader to the ANSI RBAC standard [1]. Let us give a simple example of
a non-administrative RBAC policy.
Example 1 (Basic RBAC). Consider the setting of a hospital, where a
database system dbms stores electronic health records in a number of
tables t1, t2, t3 etc. The health records can only be seen or changed by
authorized personnel. To enforce this the system dbms uses the RBAC
policy depicted in Figure 1: The employee Diana can activate the role
nurse or the role staff. In the former case she can read the tables t1 and
t2, while in the latter case she can also write the table t3.
3 Administrative RBAC Policies
The RBAC standard specifies a number of administrative functions and
controls, which can be used by an administrative authority to make policy
changes [1]. In this paper we express administrative authority in terms
of administrative privileges to model which users (or roles) can make
which policy changes. There are two types of privileges: privileges for
making new edges (denoted here by ¤), and privileges for removing edges
(denoted here by ♦). We assign the administrative privileges to roles just
like the user privileges are assigned to roles in standard RBAC. This
approach is also advocated in the literature4 and the intuition behind it
is that the RBAC policy can also be used to specify who can change the
RBAC policy [4, 12].
Clearly, administrative privileges must be an infinite set, even if we
assume that the sets of users, roles and user privileges are finite. The
reason is that administrative privileges over administrative privileges are
also administrative privileges. For example, consider the privilege to give
someone else the privilege to change the members of a role. The number
of administrative levels (the number of nestings of the ¤ connective to
be introduced below) is often restricted in existing literature (sometimes
to one [10] or to two levels [14]). We agree that in some settings multiple
4 Existing literature focusses however on defining constraints on which roles can have
which administrative privileges. For example, to prevent low roles from obtaining
privileges about higher roles [4]. For the sake of generality we do not make choices
with respect to such constraints.
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levels of administration are not useful, however, here we prefer to take
a general approach, leaving it up to security officers to choose which
administrative privileges to use in their systems.
We formalize the full set of privileges by defining a grammar that
encompasses both user privileges and administrative privileges.
Definition 2 (Privilege Grammar). Let U , R, P be sets of users,
roles and user privileges, the set of all privileges P †U,R,P is defined by the
following grammar:
p ::= q | ¤(u, r) | ♦(u, r) | ¤(r, r′) | ♦(r, r′) | ¤(r, p) | ♦(r, p).
where u ∈ U , r, r′ ∈ R, and q ∈ P .
Each administrative privilege corresponds to an administrative action
in a straightforward way. For example, the privilege ¤(u, r) allows to add
a member u to the role r. The privilege ♦(u, r) allows to remove a member
u from the role r. For simplicity we do not model privileges to change the
sets U , R, or P , and we assume that they are chosen sufficiently large
and fixed. The rationale is that changes to U , R, or P do not actually
change the policy, rather they change which policies are well-formed. For
example, in practice the set of users could be chosen to be all strings
starting with ’uid’, which is independent of which users are assigned to
roles in the RBAC policy.
As mentioned, ¤ and ♦ are connectives and the set P † is infinite.
(Even if U , R, P are finite.) For example, one could have an expression
¤(r,¤(u, r′)), which expresses the privilege to give to role r, the privilege
to a user u to the role r′. We can now define administrative policies.
Definition 3 (Administrative Policies). Let U , R, P be sets of users,
roles and user privileges, an administrative RBAC policy φ is a tuple
φ = (UA, RH , PA†),
where UA ⊆ U ×R is a set of user assignments, RH ⊆ R×R a role-
hierarchy, and PA† ⊆ R× P † are the assignments to user or administr-
taive privileges.
The set of administrative policies is denoted Φ†U,R,P , which is a superset of
the policy set ΦU,R,P from standard RBAC (see Definition 1). Administra-
tive policies allow users to make policy changes. We model this formally
by defining administrative commands.
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Definition 4 (Administrative Commands). Let U , R, P , be sets of
users, roles and user privileges, an administrative command is a term
cmd(u, a, v, v′),
where u ∈ U , a ∈ {¤,♦} and v, v′ ∈ U ∪R ∪ P †.
A command queue is a list of administrative commands, denoted cq =
cmd(u, a, v1, v2) : cmd(u′, a′, v′1, v′2)..., where : denotes the list constructor.
The set of command queues is denoted CQ . The empty command queue
is denoted ε. The administrative functionality of the RBAC reference
monitor is modeled by a command queue, and an administrative RBAC
policy. The RBAC reference monitor changes the policy by executing
administrative commands in the command queue. We formalize this by a
transition function.
Definition 5 (Administrative Transition). Let cq ∈ CQ be a com-
mand queue, and φ ∈ Φ† an administrative policy, the administrative
transition function, denoted ⇒:⇒: CQ × Φ† → CQ × Φ†, is
〈cmd(u,¤, v, v′) : cq , φ〉 ⇒ 〈cq , φ ∪ (v, v′)〉, if u→φ r and r →φ ¤(v, v′).
〈cmd(u,♦, v, v′) : cq , φ〉 ⇒ 〈cq , φ \ (v, v′)〉, if u→φ r and r →φ ♦(v, v′).
〈cmd(. . .) : cq , φ〉 ⇒ 〈cq , φ〉, otherwise.
Note that if an administrative command is not allowed by the policy
φ, then the command is removed from the queue, without changing the
policy φ. Below, a sequence of executions of commands in the queue is
called a run, denoted by ⇒∗. We give a brief example by applying this
model in a practical situation.
Example 2. Consider the policy in Example 1. Alice, the security officer,
wants to delegate some of her administrative authority to the employees
of the Human Resource department (HR). In this way, members of HR
can appoint new staff members or nurses, without having to recur to
Alice each time. To delegate these administrative privileges, Alice uses
an administrative policy.
Figure 2 shows Alice’s policy: Members of HR can assign and revoke
certain users to staff and nurse roles. Additionally, to protect the con-
fidentiality of health records in the tables t2 and t3 Alice delegated a
revocation privilege about the role dbusr2 to the role dbusr3. The admin-
istrative policy hence not only describes who can access which resources,
but also which roles have privileges to change to the policy.
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   (bob,staff)
   (joe,nurse)
   (joe,nurse)HRSO
dbusr3
Fig. 2. The administrative RBAC policy deployed by Alice, the security officer.
4 Administrative Refinement
In the previous section we have defined a general class of administrative
policies for the General Hierachical RBAC model. In existing literature [3,
4, 6, 9, 14], the administrative privileges in RBAC policies are treated just
like ordinary user privileges. In this section we show that this is more re-
strictive than necessary for safety, and that a more flexible approach can
be very useful in practice. This section is organized as follows. First we
formalize the notion of administrative refinement. In section 4.1 we show
that the privilege ordering for assignment privileges [5] yields adminis-
trative refinements of policies, and in section 4.2 we present the formal
proof that the privilege ordering is decidable.
Ignoring policy changes for the moment, an access control policy ψ is
safer than a policy φ, if ψ grants users to less privileges than φ does. We
call this non-administrative refinement.
Definition 6 (Non-Administrative Refinement). Let φ, ψ ∈ Φ† be
two RBAC policies. We say that ψ is a non-administrative refinement of
φ, denoted φ º ψ, iff for any v ∈ U ∪R and any user privilege p ∈ P ,
v →ψ p implies v →φ p.
We give a basic example to illustrate this definition.
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Example 3 (Non-Administrative Refinement). Consider the policy depicted
in Figure 1. Clearly, by removing any of the edges in the policy one ob-
tains a refinement of the policy. For example, by removing Diana from
the staff role. There is a more fine-grained type of refinement that rear-
ranges edges. For example, if we replace the edge between Diana and staff
with an edge between Diana and nurse, then we have another refinement
of the policy. On the other hand, if we replace the edge between nurse
and dbusr1 with an edge between nurse and dbusr2, we do not obtain a
refinement, as nurses get more privileges.
We can now define administrative refinement. The goal of an admin-
istrative policy is to allow certain policy changes. Basically, an adminis-
trative refinement of a policy is a policy that allows safer policy changes.
Note that a policy change made by one user may allow other users to
make new policy changes, and so on. Therefore, to determine the possible
policy changes that are allowed, we must take into account which users
are performing administrative actions, and in which order5. We formalize
administrative refinement as follows.
Definition 7 (Administrative Refinement). Let φ, ψ ∈ Φ† be admin-
istrative RBAC policies. We say that ψ is an administrative refinement
of φ, denoted φ º† ψ, if, for any queue of administrative commands
cq ∈ CQ, there is a queue of administrative commands cq ′ ∈ CQ, such
that φ′ º ψ′, where 〈cq , φ〉 ⇒∗ 〈ε, φ′〉, and 〈cq ′, ψ〉 ⇒∗ 〈ε, ψ′〉, and cq ′ is
such that, it contains the same number of commands, and the n-th com-
mand in cq and the n-th command in cq ′ are both of the form cmd(u, ., .),
where n ranges over the number of commands in the queue cq.
Basically the definition states that, if ψ allows a certain policy change then
either the same policy change is also allowed by the policy φ, or it is a pol-
icy change that results in a safer policy. It is easy to see that administra-
tive refinement implies non-administrative refinement; take cq = cq ′ = ε.
In other words, if φ º† ψ holds then also φ º ψ holds.
4.1 Ordering Administrative Privileges
In this section, we introduce first a privilege ordering on administrative
privileges [5] and we show that the ordering of the administrative priv-
5 Taking into account the order is more precise than in the HRU model [7] where it is
assumed that there is a group of untrusted users who can collude in any order, which
does not allow to distinguish the policy lowrole → ¤(r, p) from highrole → ¤(r, p)
(but the latter is more safe).
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ileges yields administrative refinements of a policy. At the end of this
section we show how the privilege ordering can be used in practice to
allow more flexible policy management.
Consider a simple setting where a sub-administrator has the explicit
right to assign a user u to a high role in the role-hierarchy. There is no
reason to forbid the sub-administrator to assign the user to a lower role.
This can be seen as follows. If u becomes a member of the high role,
then u can activate also the lower roles and obtain their privileges, as if u
was assigned to it explicitly. In existing RBAC literature administrative
privileges are not interpreted in this way. The ordering of privileges, just
described here, can be defined formally as follows.
Definition 8 (Privilege Ordering). Let φ ∈ Φ† be an administrative
policy, let p, p1, p2 be privileges in P †, and let v1, v2, v3, v4 be users (U) or
roles (R). We define the relation Ãφ as the smallest relation satisfying:
pÃφ p (1)
¤(v2, v3)Ãφ ¤(v1, v4), if v1 →φ v2 and v3 →φ v4. (2)
¤(v2, p1)Ãφ ¤(v1, p2), if v1 →φ v2 and p1 Ãφ p2. (3)
The orderingÃφ is both reflexive and transitive. In practice the privilege
ordering can be used to allow users, with administrative privileges, to be
implicitly authorized for weaker administrative privileges.
It can be shown (see the Theorem 1 below) that by replacing an ad-
ministrative privilege by a weaker one (with respect to the ordering), one
obtains an administrative refinement of the policy. In other words, giving
administrative users also the weaker administrative privileges allows them
to perform also safer administrative operations than the ones originally
allowed.
Theorem 1. Let φ ∈ Φ† be an administrative policy, let (r, p) ∈ φ be a
privilege assignment, and let q be a privilege such that p Ãφ q, then the
policy ψ = (φ \ (r, p))∪ (r, q) is an administrative refinement of φ, that is
φ º† ψ.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is by case analysis over the different cases in
definition 8.
The first case is trivial, since the relation º† is reflexive. For the
second case take a policy φ with privilege assignment (r,¤(v2, v3)), and
v1 →φ v2, and v3 →φ v4. Let ψ be the same policy where this privilege
assignment is replaced by (r,¤(v1, v4)). So φ allows the command
cmd(u,¤, v2, v3),
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which changes φ to φ′ = φ ∪ (v2, v3), while ψ allows the command
cmd(u,¤, v1, v4),
which changes ψ to ψ′ = ψ ∪ (v2, v3). To show that φ º† ψ it is sufficient
to show that φ′ º ψ: In ψ′ v1 has the privileges of v4, but in φ′ v1 has
the same privileges, due to the edges v1 →φ v2, v3 →φ v4 and v2 → v3.
For the third case take a policy φ with privilege assignment (r,¤(v2, p1)),
and v1 →φ v2, and p1 Ãφ p2. Let ψ be the same policy where this priv-
ilege assignment is replaced by the weaker privilege (r,¤(v1, p2)). So φ
allows the command
cmd(u,¤, v2, p1),
which changes φ to φ′ = φ ∪ (v2, p1), while ψ allows the command
cmd(u,¤, v1, p2),
which changes ψ to ψ′ = ψ ∪ (v1, p2). In case p1 is a user privilege, p1
equals p2 and the proof is the same as for the second case. We simply
show that ψ′ is a non-administrative refinement of φ′. On the other hand,
if p1 is an administrative privilege we must show that the subsequent
commands allowed by ψ′ yield refinements of the policies created by com-
mands allowed by φ′. This can be shown by induction over the structure
(the number of nestings of ¤) of p1.
Let us now give an example of how the privilege ordering can be used
in a practical situation.
Example 4 (A Flexworker). Consider the administrative RBAC policy
depicted in Figure 2. The role HR has the administrative privilege to
add new members to the staff role. There is also a role below staff called
nurse, with additional privileges. Bob is a flexworker, Jane is from the
HR department.
Bob arrives at the hospital and his job is to put some order in the
health record database. To do the job he needs to have dbusr2 privileges.
Jane a member of the role HR can give the necessary clearance to Bob.
Jane can give Bob staff privileges (the dashed edge in Figure 3). If she
does so, then she must urge Bob to apply the principle of least privilege,
by activating only the role dbusr2, and not e.g. the staff or the nurse role,
which would yield excessive privileges, for instance medical privileges. But
Jane can only hope that Bob does so.
The privilege ordering implies that Jane can assign Bob directly to















Fig. 3. A practical example of the use of administrative refinement.
add Bob to the staff role. In a way, instead of preaching the principle of
least privilege to Bob, Jane applies it for him.
Remark 1 (Less privileges, safer policies). In this paper we have defined
a policy to be safer when the policy gives users less privileges. The prin-
ciple of least privilege, and the way it is supported by the RBAC session
mechanism, is a well-known example of the usefulness of this definition.
One could perhaps argue that there could be practical situations where
having less privileges is not more safe. For example one could imagine
a privilege to append to a log file. Removing this privilege could cause
programs to run unsafely, that is without writing logs. We believe how-
ever that such peculiarities should be resolved at the application layer.
For example by changing the program so that it halts when no logs can
be written.
4.2 Tractability
In this section we address an important practical issue. We prove that
the ordering relation (Definition 8) is tractable. Since the full set P of
privileges is infinite, this result is not immediate. For instance, a naive
forward search does not necessarily terminate (see the example at the end
of this section). The proof indicates how a decision algorithm, deciding
which privileges are to be given to which roles, can be implemented at an
RBAC reference monitor.
11
Lemma 1 (Decidability of the Ordering Relation). Let φ ∈ Φ† be
an administrative policy, and p, q ∈ P † be two privileges, it is decidable
whether pÃφ q.
Proof. The proof is by structural induction over q.
The base cases are when q is not of the form ¤(r, r′). We show that
for the three base cases pÃφ q is decidable:
– Either q is a user privilege from P . In this case p Ãφ q holds only
when p = q (see rule (1) in Definition 8).
– Or q is of the form ¤(v, v′) for some v, v′ ∈ U ∪R, in which case only
rule (2) needs to be checked, which has finite premises.
For the induction step, suppose that q is ¤(r′, p′), for some role r′
and privilege p′. Now, p Ã q can only hold if the premises of rule (3)
hold. The premises of rule (3) are decidable, either because they are fi-
nite, or because the induction hypothesis is applicable (in p′ Ã q′, q′ is
structurally smaller than q, regardless of p′).
Let us show how the proof above can be used in practice, as a proce-
dure for checking whether one privilege is weaker than another.
Example 5. Consider Example 4 again. Can Jane assign Bob to the dbusr2
role? We have to check that the role staff inherits the privilege¤(bob, dbusr2 ).
Using the first part of Definition 8, one finds that the staff role has the
privilege ¤(bob, staff ). Now we should decide whether
¤(bob, staff )Ã ¤(bob, dbusr2 ).
This follows trivially from the first rule of Definition 8.
To give a more involved example, suppose that the system adminis-
trator Alice has the privilege ¤(staff ,¤(bob, staff )). Can Charlie give to
staff, the privilege ¤(bob, dbusr2 ) directly? We have to check whether
¤(staff ,¤(bob, staff ))Ã ¤(staff ,¤(bob, dbusr2 )).
This is indeed the case by using rule (3) first, and then rule (2).
Now, for the sake of exposition, let us remove the edge between the
staff and the dbusr2 role. Let us show how to determine that the previous
relation does not hold: Now only rule (3) applies, in which case we must
decide whether ¤(bob, staff )Ã ¤(bob, dbusr2 ). This is a base case of the
induction described in the proof of Lemma 1: Only rule (2) remains to be
checked and than we can conclude that it does not hold.
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It could be useful to find all the privileges p′ weaker than a given p.
To our surprise, in some cases the set of all privileges p′ weaker than a
given privilege p, is infinite. Let us give an example.
Example 6 (Infinitely many weaker privileges). Consider a policy where
(r2,¤(r1, r2)) ∈ PA. We should stress here that this is by no means
an artificial, or peculiar policy: Members of r2 can make members of r1
member too.
Suppose we are interested in finding all the privileges weaker than
¤(r1, r2). The first weaker privilege we discover by applying rule (2) in
definition 8:
¤(r1,¤(r1, r2)).
Using this result in rule (3), we find another weaker privilege,
¤(r1,¤(r1,¤(r1, r2))),
and we can use this again in rule (3), and so on.
Remark 2. The outer nesting in the last term in the previous example is
in a sense redundant. Instead of assigning the privilege ¤(r1, r2) to r1,
one assigns the privilege to do so, to r1. This only requires the users in
role r1 to perform an extra administrative step, which seems unnecessary.
It is cumbersome for the user in r1, and it does not introduce any safe-
guards. We conjecture that for all practical purpose one could stop after
n applications of rule (3), where n is the length of the longest chain in
RH . We do not make this observation more formal here.
5 Related Work
The problem of administration of an RBAC system was first addressed by
Sandhu et al. [10]. Later, numerous articles have been published extending
or improving the administration model proposed there [3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13,
14]. We discuss some of them.
Barka et al. [3] distinguish between original and delegated user role
assignments. Delegations are modeled using special sets, and different sets
are used for single step and double step delegations (which must remain
disjoint). A function is used to verify if membership to a role can be del-
egated. Privileges can also be delegated, provided they are in the special
set of delegatable privileges belonging to the role. In their work, each level
of delegation requires the definition of tens of sets and functions, whereas
in our model administrative privileges, of an arbitrary complexity, are
13
simply assigned to roles, just like the ordinary privileges. The PDBM
model [14] defines a cascaded delegation. This form of delegation is also
expressible in our grammar (by nesting the ¤ connective). In the PDBM
model, however, each delegation requires the addition of a separate role,
which is cumbersome given the fact that there are already many roles to
manage. In our model the administrative privileges are assigned to roles
just like the ordinary privileges. It is not required to add any additional
roles.
A number of proposals define general constraints on the administra-
tive privileges. For example, the constraint that a user must first have a
privilege, before being allowed to delegate it to other users. Note that, as
mentioned earlier, in this paper no particular choice is made with respect
to such constraints. Zhang et al. [13] implement rule based constraints
on delegations. They demonstrate their model using a Prolog program.
Basically, they analyze the properties of a centralized RBAC system, fo-
cussing on so-called separation of duty policies. Crampton [4] defines the
concept of administrative scope. Basically a role r is in the scope of a
role r′ if there is no role above r′ that is not below r. They show how
administrative scope can be used to constrain delegations to evolve in a
natural progression in the role hierarchy. Bandman et al. [2] use a gen-
eral constraint language to specify constraints on who can receive certain
delegations.
6 Conclusion
With this work we make a contribution to the design of flexible admin-
istration models for RBAC. Flexible administration is important to cut
the cost of maintenance and to enable the RBAC system to adapt to
changing circumstances. In general, the flexibility of management is a
very important requisite for access control systems. Discretionary access
control systems are prevalently used (see for instance Linux, Windows)
because users can change the policies about their files so easily. Mandatory
access control systems, on the other hand (such as RBAC) are deployed
to a lesser extent because they are too inflexible. There are settings where
flexibility is required, but discretionary access control is inappropriate. A
good example is the setting of the protection of electronic health records.
The high availability requirements for health records require flexibility,
and at the same time, policies protecting health records are not at the
discretion of medical personnel creating and using them. RBAC, with a
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flexible decentralized policy management mechanism could be an inter-
esting solution in such settings.
The issue of designing flexible yet safe policy administration mecha-
nisms for RBAC has received much attention recently [3, 4, 6, 9, 14]. With
this paper we contribute to these lines of research. We introduce the no-
tion of administrative refinement of policies, and we show how it can be
used to allow more flexible management of the RBAC policy. Concretely,
our contribution is a the definition of a general class of administrative
policies, and a formal definition of administrative refinement. We have
shown that there is a natural ordering for administrative privileges which
yields administrative refinements of policies, and we have presented the
proof that this ordering is tractable. We also showed how useful our ex-
tension is in practice. Our approach allows administrative users to be
implicitly authorized for weaker administrative operations, which is thus
more flexible and more safe as well.
Revocation privileges are included in our model, but we have not
identified (yet) a separate ordering for revocation privileges. We believe
that this is an interesting possibility for further research.
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